Mailvox: Sextus say relax
Not being a reader of this blog, Delavagus would have had no reason to know I'd read Sextus Empiricus last October, which is why I'm somewhat more familiar with Pyrrhonian scepticism than he probably assumed. Anyhow, the two questions he presented weren't difficult to answer, although I leave it to the reader to decide how effectively I answered them.
That being said, yes, I do still want to charge skepticism, specifically Pyrrhonian scepticism, with incoherence. In answer to (a), I think the incoherence consists of the inherent contradiction between its arguments and its aims. In Chapter XII What Is the Aim of Scepticism, Empiricus writes: "It follows naturally to treat of the aim of the Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, then, that he aim of the Sceptic is "tranquility of soul" in those things which pertain to the opinion and moderation in the things that life imposes."
This creates two problems. It should be readily apparent that we can observe here that the Sceptic is claiming knowledge of things that, by virtue of his own philosophical system, he cannot possibly know. If he cannot know that the soul exists, he cannot reasonably aim for its tranquility. If he cannot know what tranquility is, he cannot aim for helping his soul reach that state. If he has no quantifiable metric for the things that life imposes, he cannot know what is excess, what is insufficient, and still less what is that desired moderation. Pyrrhonian scepticism is incoherent as both a philosophy and as a way of life because it is little more than a philosophically offensive weapon that can be trained just as effectively on its own stated purposes as on anything else.
Moreover, it can be shown to empirically fail as well, at least to the extent that it actually exists today. One of the arguments presented by the Uncertainty crowd is that the unquestioning nature of belief certainty is dangerous because it permits people to act freely without remorse or guilty conscience. But what is the most extreme belief certainty if not "'tranquility of soul' in those things which pertain to the opinion"? The member of the SS-Totenkopfverbände who was morally certain of the rightness of the Final Solution and liquidated the enemies of the National Socialist regime during the day without losing any sleep over it at night is, by Sextus Empiricus's own chosen measure, a more perfect Sceptic than the philosophy student who tosses and turns throughout the night wrestling with the troubling question of his own existence. Moreover, in discussing various beliefs with the Uncertainty crowd at Three Pound Brain, (who are not necessarily proper Pyrrhonian School Sceptics by any means), it is readily observable that they possess no tranquility of soul, as they are, by their own admission, deeply bothered by the mere existence of beliefs with which they strongly disagree.
Concerning (b), Sextus's argument against peritrope fails on three counts. First, he erroneously conflates the subset (his particular philosophy) with the set (all philosophico-rational thought); because there is philosophico-rational thought that is not Pyrrhonian scepticism, all refutation of the latter cannot automatically be taken as any refutation of the former. Second, even if Sextus were correct and charging the skeptic with self-refutation did amount to charging philosophico-rational thought as such with self-refutation, that doesn't change the fact that since Pyrrhonian scepticism is a subset of philosophico-rational thought, if the charge is substantiated and all philosophico-rational thought is, in fact, self-refuting, then the charge of peritrope against Scepticism must also be correct! It's not a valid defense. Third, Sextus doesn't realize that the intended target of Pyrrhonian arguments is irrelevant with regards to its self-refuting nature; it doesn't matter what he is intending to target when it can be shown that his arguments necessarily also target his own stated aims.
And in conclusion, I note that it is not only the core aims that are susceptible to a valid charge of peritrope, but each of the Ten Tropes that are used to justify Pyrrhonian "suspension of judgment" as well.
I’m particularly interested if, after reading [his two posts on ancient skepticism], you still want to charge skepticism with incoherence. If so, (a) what do you think the incoherence consists in? and (b) in what way does Sextus’s argument against peritrope fail?First, let me point out that I've told Delavagus I am quite willing to respond in detail to those two posts on ancient skepticism if he's willing to allow me to post large chunks of them - properly credited to him, of course - here on the blog so that everyone easily can follow along. But it's not necessary to go into that level of detail to answer these two questions, although I have to point out that my charge of incoherence was not directed at Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonian school of scepticism, or even skepticism in general, but rather at the professed uncertainty of R. Scott Bakker.
That being said, yes, I do still want to charge skepticism, specifically Pyrrhonian scepticism, with incoherence. In answer to (a), I think the incoherence consists of the inherent contradiction between its arguments and its aims. In Chapter XII What Is the Aim of Scepticism, Empiricus writes: "It follows naturally to treat of the aim of the Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, then, that he aim of the Sceptic is "tranquility of soul" in those things which pertain to the opinion and moderation in the things that life imposes."
This creates two problems. It should be readily apparent that we can observe here that the Sceptic is claiming knowledge of things that, by virtue of his own philosophical system, he cannot possibly know. If he cannot know that the soul exists, he cannot reasonably aim for its tranquility. If he cannot know what tranquility is, he cannot aim for helping his soul reach that state. If he has no quantifiable metric for the things that life imposes, he cannot know what is excess, what is insufficient, and still less what is that desired moderation. Pyrrhonian scepticism is incoherent as both a philosophy and as a way of life because it is little more than a philosophically offensive weapon that can be trained just as effectively on its own stated purposes as on anything else.
Moreover, it can be shown to empirically fail as well, at least to the extent that it actually exists today. One of the arguments presented by the Uncertainty crowd is that the unquestioning nature of belief certainty is dangerous because it permits people to act freely without remorse or guilty conscience. But what is the most extreme belief certainty if not "'tranquility of soul' in those things which pertain to the opinion"? The member of the SS-Totenkopfverbände who was morally certain of the rightness of the Final Solution and liquidated the enemies of the National Socialist regime during the day without losing any sleep over it at night is, by Sextus Empiricus's own chosen measure, a more perfect Sceptic than the philosophy student who tosses and turns throughout the night wrestling with the troubling question of his own existence. Moreover, in discussing various beliefs with the Uncertainty crowd at Three Pound Brain, (who are not necessarily proper Pyrrhonian School Sceptics by any means), it is readily observable that they possess no tranquility of soul, as they are, by their own admission, deeply bothered by the mere existence of beliefs with which they strongly disagree.
Concerning (b), Sextus's argument against peritrope fails on three counts. First, he erroneously conflates the subset (his particular philosophy) with the set (all philosophico-rational thought); because there is philosophico-rational thought that is not Pyrrhonian scepticism, all refutation of the latter cannot automatically be taken as any refutation of the former. Second, even if Sextus were correct and charging the skeptic with self-refutation did amount to charging philosophico-rational thought as such with self-refutation, that doesn't change the fact that since Pyrrhonian scepticism is a subset of philosophico-rational thought, if the charge is substantiated and all philosophico-rational thought is, in fact, self-refuting, then the charge of peritrope against Scepticism must also be correct! It's not a valid defense. Third, Sextus doesn't realize that the intended target of Pyrrhonian arguments is irrelevant with regards to its self-refuting nature; it doesn't matter what he is intending to target when it can be shown that his arguments necessarily also target his own stated aims.
And in conclusion, I note that it is not only the core aims that are susceptible to a valid charge of peritrope, but each of the Ten Tropes that are used to justify Pyrrhonian "suspension of judgment" as well.
Labels: mailvox, philosophy
87 Comments:
The snake that swallows it's own tail? Sure, I think I read that well enough. And, mostly, I agree. Or, I agree in logic. I believe you disseminated the facts, logic, and took his own words apart well. I just don't agree in spirit. I simply think the author failed to sound out the reasoning well. I agree with some of what he is getting at, just not his particular paths or logic to it. He pulled a Donald Verilli, you pulled a Supreme Court. Well, if Obamacare was reasonable, potentially constitutionally correct, and all. Bad peer review (as usual)? Well, that's my take.
I agree with some of what he is getting at, just not his particular paths or logic to it.
Actually, I do too. I'm actually sympathetic to quite a few of the Pyrrhonian concepts, but Sextus takes them too far, applies them too liberally, and uses them to reach conclusions that are both logically and empirically fallacious.
The skeptic is not skeptical enough of skepticism, and skepticism is too certain of the skeptic.
The skeptic is not skeptical enough of skepticism, and skepticism is too certain of the skeptic.
Imagine that. It's rather like the Communist who doesn't turn over all of his own income to the State, the feminist who advocates legal bias on behalf of women, or the Congress that exempts itself from its own laws.
Nice try! First of all, remember that we're dealing with _translations_ here. I have no idea what translation you're using -- since it's neither the old Bury translation, nor the newer and more reliable Annas-Barnes translation -- but the quote you pulled from it is really quite bad. For one, 'ataraxia' (quietude, tranquility) is not "of the soul."
But that's a minor point. More importantly, I'm afraid you've misrepresented the skeptic's position vis-a-vis his ability to make claims. But let's start at the beginning.
One question: In order to avoid the conclusion that charging skepticism with incoherence entails charging philosophico-rational thought as such without incoherence, you'd have to find a way for philosopical-rational thought to solve the problem of the criterion and escape the Agrippan Trilemma.
So please, explain how you do that. We can start there.
@Daniel:
Do you know the distinction between ancient and modern skepticism? Ancient skepticism, unlike modern, IS skeptical of its own negative conclusions: that's central to the whole project of returning us to common life.
This stuff is absurdly difficult to follow without context. Who's Delvagus, again?
@delvagus
Yes. I was writing of the Pyrrhonian school, which I assumed was obvious, given the context of the post.
First of all, remember that we're dealing with _translations_ here. I have no idea what translation you're using -- since it's neither the old Bury translation, nor the newer and more reliable Annas-Barnes translation -- but the quote you pulled from it is really quite bad.
I'm using the one by Mary Mills Patrick published in 1899. JB Bury did one? I'll have to get it, I'm a fan of his histories.
More importantly, I'm afraid you've misrepresented the skeptic's position vis-a-vis his ability to make claims.
How so? I didn't say anything at all about his ability to make claims, I've focused on his stated aims.
In order to avoid the conclusion that charging skepticism with incoherence entails charging philosophico-rational thought as such without incoherence, you'd have to find a way for philosopical-rational thought to solve the problem of the criterion and escape the Agrippan Trilemma. So please, explain how you do that.
I don't believe that is a correct statement or that it is necessary to escape the Agrippan Trilemma to charge skepticism with incoherence. Do you claim that all "philosophico-rational thought as such" is skepticism? Are you seriously going to assert that there no philosophico-rational thought that is not skepticism?
Pyrrhonian scepticism is incoherent as both a philosophy and as a way of life because it is little more than a philosophically offensive weapon that can be trained just as effectively on its own stated purposes as on anything else.
Which is why the person using it must be careful to apply it only in the desired direction. Like a flamethrower, or poison gas, you don't want any of it to blow back onto yourself.
Delvagus if you don't mind, would you please give us the translated version of that quote from your preferred edition. It would be interesting to see if that changes anything significant.
How unsurprising: a "translation" dodge. The SS officer's "tranquility of the soul", as described above, is a perfect definitional example of ataraxia.
It is unsurprising that someone who would make such an obvious logical error as to conflate the subset of skepticism with all of philosophical-rational thought would resort to irrelevant translation differences.
Also, I should add that I'm not concerned with avoiding a charge of incoherence against philosophico-rational thought. I suspect you didn't read the post closely enough, as I wrote the following:
"Second, even if Sextus were correct and charging the skeptic with self-refutation did amount to charging philosophico-rational thought as such with self-refutation, that doesn't change the fact that since Pyrrhonian scepticism is a subset of philosophico-rational thought, if the charge is substantiated and all philosophico-rational thought is, in fact, self-refuting, then the charge of peritrope against Scepticism must also be correct! It's not a valid defense."
Threatening to burn down the entire house of philosophy doesn't make skepticism coherent. It tends to suggest quite the opposite, actually.
We say, then, that he aim of the Sceptic is "tranquility of soul" in those things which pertain to the opinion and moderation in the things that life imposes."
This is a psychological aim, philosophy as therapy. Sextus Empiricus is saying skepticism helps in relieving cognitive dissonance. There is no reason to stress out of over incompatible beliefs because you can't be absolutely sure they're incompatible. And how is he making all of these factual statements if he doesn't believe in facts? Human language is not a series of truth valued propositions rattled off in logical sequence. Human thought isn't even logical as shown by the difficulty of teaching children to reason correctly. Our notions of logic are built on a very non-logical foundation. The truth is not knowable is a normal human statement and meant to be interpreted as such and not within the narrow domain its attempting to criticize.
As a side note attacks on skepticism can easily be turned into attacks on God's omnipotence with the old cliche of can God create even a rock so large he can't lift it? The preferred way of dealing with this is to specify that God can do anything that's logically possible and define away the challenge to God's power but its just as easy to say that no truths are knowable besides this one and dodge as well as any apologist.
As a side note attacks on skepticism can easily be turned into attacks on God's omnipotence with the old cliche of can God create even a rock so large he can't lift it?
Lift it off of what?
There is no reason to stress out of over incompatible beliefs because you can't be absolutely sure they're incompatible.
Sure there is... such as when you have to choose between them, just to give one example.
What is the difference between ataraxia, Stoic's apatheia, and Buddhist Upekka?
They all sound similar, especially after a doobie or two.
There is no reason to stress out of over incompatible beliefs because you can't be absolutely sure they're incompatible.
Sure there is... such as when you have to choose between them, just to give one example.
Hey I agree this type of skepticism would be a really miserable way to live your life, constantly having to disbelieve or just accept without thought all your problems. I would not derive any "tranquility of the soul" from it. But the point is his goal of skepticism is a not a philosophical one but instead is like someone telling you to take up golf to help you relax. I don't like golf but I wouldn't tell the guy who suggested it that he is logically incorrect.
A bit out of context, but this reminded me of the arguments with Calvinists. What do you think, Vox?
Question
"This is a psychological aim, philosophy as therapy. Sextus Empiricus is saying skepticism helps in relieving cognitive dissonance."
I believe this is agreed upon by everyone - see the counterexample of the non-skeptic whose cognitive dissonance is relieved by certainty, not skepticism.
The point is that skepticism is either too skeptical of the (in Delvagus' words) "negative conclusions" or not skeptical enough of the "tranquility" (atarxia) objective. Skepticism, by its own philosophy, can't possibly draw a clear line for itself.
In leaving out a line, it, in effect, says nothing. To which the scholars of skepticism say, "Exactly right!" and find the elusive tranquility of which they are not skeptical.
The skeptical school, for all its merits of inquiry (it is, generally, good to approach questions without the answer in mind, as far as that is possible*), becomes a wishful, and simultaneously vague and certain dogma.
But the point is his goal of skepticism is a not a philosophical one but instead is like someone telling you to take up golf to help you relax. I don't like golf but I wouldn't tell the guy who suggested it that he is logically incorrect.
In other words, a form of Stoicism, who do it rather better in my opinion. But your analogy isn't quite correct. The guy isn't telling you to take up golf to help you relax, he's telling you that you MUST take up golf in order to relax, that you cannot possibly relax if you don't play golf. And I would most certainly tell the guy that he's not only logically incorrect, but empirically correct as well based on all the golfers I know.
Question
But the point is his goal of skepticism is a not a philosophical one but instead is like someone telling you to take up golf to help you relax. I don't like golf but I wouldn't tell the guy who suggested it that he is logically incorrect.
It is actually more like telling someone to take up hunting to help relax, by becoming the prey. As long as you run in a certain direction and never look back, you may not even hear the shot before it takes you down.
Adopting skepticism to achieve its stated end is nothing more than bad advice. I know a lot of skeptics, but have never met a tranquil one.
Skepticism, as Vox pointed out, is a self defeating proposition. Once cannot say he is certain there is no such thing as certainty.
but its just as easy to say that no truths are knowable besides this one and dodge as well as any apologist.
And as you said, you can't live that way. You can be certain that if you step in front of a bus, the bus wins.
What? Next time Vox, remember, all of this shit is intellectual turds on diarrhea day.
Just a few quick points, since I'm on my cell phone.
First, you did talk about the skeptic's ability to make claims, when you said something like: they can't make claims about things like the soul, etc, since they claim to have no knowledge of such things.
More generally, I see little evidence here that you read or understood my posts. To help me gauge whether it's worth getting into a longer, more detailed discussion about this, could you please summarize the view as I represent it? If you can't give a fair, sympathetic interpretation of a view you disagree with, then I'm not sure we'll be able to make any progress.
Thanks!
He answered your direct questions (a) and (b). As a third party observer, I say that clearly counts as significant evidence that he read and understood you.
Did you overlook that, or do you have any justification to suggest that answering a direct question is not, somehow, evidence?
Based on this most recent post, I predict a Broken Bamboo defense transitioning into a fighting withdrawal.
First, you did talk about the skeptic's ability to make claims, when you said something like: they can't make claims about things like the soul, etc, since they claim to have no knowledge of such things.
Yes, I referred to the skeptic's claims in the process of making a series of If/Then statements. Perhaps it was an overstatement to claim that the skeptic can't possibly know if the soul exists or not. But this isn't relevant to the points under discussion.
To help me gauge whether it's worth getting into a longer, more detailed discussion about this, could you please summarize the view as I represent it?
No, please recall that you're the one who asked me the questions in the first place. I answered them in a straightforward and substantive manner. At this point, it's not appropriate for you to suddenly decide if the discussion is merited, especially since you still haven't answered the two questions I posed to you.
You made the following claim: "In order to avoid the conclusion that charging skepticism with incoherence entails charging philosophico-rational thought as such without incoherence, you'd have to find a way for philosopical-rational thought to solve the problem of the criterion and escape the Agrippan Trilemma."
But you have not, as yet, provided any justification for that claim and I have already shown that it is both a) unnecessary, and b) untrue. So, do you claim that all "philosophico-rational thought as such" is skepticism? Do you assert that there no philosophico-rational thought that is not skepticism?
Based on this most recent post, I predict a Broken Bamboo defense transitioning into a fighting withdrawal.
We'll see. I suspect by the way Delavagus went right to the exact same point even though it doesn't appear to deal with the points I raised, the problem may be that he's regurgitating what he's been taught and he doesn't actually understand it well enough to see that I've correctly spotted the weakness in the logical structure. Alternatively, perhaps there is something that I'm missing or that I don't understand and he can point it out to me. I don't pretend to be an expert on Pyrrhonism, I mean, I read the one book eight months ago on a plane.
Sounds to me like he's uncertain of his position and needs you to explain it to him.
I'm certain Tiger Woods kicked that golf club on the 16th hole at the Masters due to being overly relaxed.
It appears this philosophy is best put into practice by refraining from all manner of thought. The thought process is decidedly conclusive - traversal of the neural network is goal oriented and controlled by the conscious, otherwise, neurons are firing off at random - what we call a a seizure or some form of mental disorder. If one doesn't think to arrive at some conclusion, what is the bloody point of it? As such, I dub this philosophy, Blondism.
Having read more than one book on Pyrrhonism, albeit more than 8 months ago, I'd wager that one does not need to read anything more than a fair encyclopedia entry to realize that the arguments from skepticism (both classical and popular, modern anti-intellectual versions and perversions of the philosophy) are flapping in the wind and easily plucked.
The key to successful skepticking is a monastic adherence to faith in the naked emperor.I'm paraphrasing grossly here, but one of the pupils of Pyrrho wrote that no assertion could be held in higher regard than the other, including the assertion that no assertion could be held in higher regard... Therefore, because such an assertion was no better than its opposite, then one should stop worrying and choose happiness.
Pyrrho, as far as I can tell, was the Greek equivalent of Bobby McFerrin. This may explain why his ideas continue to be catchy even in this present age. Most people don't even realize that they are humming along.
Daniel April 24, 2012 1:22 PM - but one of the pupils of Pyrrho wrote that no assertion could be held in higher regard than the other, including the assertion that no assertion could be held in higher regard...
Force is the tie breaker.
I suspect by the way Delavagus went right to the exact same point even though it doesn't appear to deal with the points I raised, the problem may be that he's regurgitating what he's been taught and he doesn't actually understand it well enough to see that I've correctly spotted the weakness in the logical structure.
Regurgitating what you are taught without understanding is a real problem these days. It was actually doing that and getting my ass handed to me in a debate with an atheist that lead me to your site. So hopefully, for his sake, he'll learn the lesson that I did. On the other hand, he may be true to form and never learn.
It is always a problem. Because it is a fundamental, automatic learning method, rote memory is a critical and overlooked principle for intellectual rigor: unattended, it can devolve into half-remembered lessons and blind faith in memorized errors.
I had a similar, but converting, experience after losing an argument about, of all matters, William Jennings Bryan.
It's always good to see leftist intellectuals exposed as the insipid and vicious little frauds they really are. Pyrrhonism apparently calls for the stoning of those conclusively deemed to be poopy heads. The enthusiasm with which the enlightened ones at Bakker's take their turns at Vox is most amusing.
I had a similar, but converting, experience after losing an argument about, of all matters, William Jennings Bryan.
Mine came when I got my lunch handed to me 30 years ago by a Young Earth Creationist. I don't buy his position today,* but I learned a very valuable lesson about what happens when you don't understand what you're parroting and confuse familiarity with understanding.
* I was argued out of my old position, not into his.
Come on, Vox! Why do you have to be so difficult?
Let's have a quick refresher, shall we?
I asked you to summarize the view I presented. Doing so, I maintain, would be extremely helpful in fostering a constructive dialogue. You refused. Why did you refuse? Because, you said, "[Y]ou're the one who asked me the questions in the first place... At this point, it's not appropriate for you to suddenly decide if the discussion is merited."
But let's go back for a moment, yes? Here's what I actually wrote on the TPB:
"... in the interests of 'getting at the heart of the disagreement,' I invite you (a) to explain what the view is, and then (b) to explain why it’s wrong. I’m particularly interested if, after reading, you still want to charge skepticism with incoherence. If so, (a) what do you think the incoherence consists in? and (b) in what way does Sextus’s argument against peritrope fail?"
As you can see, I lodged the request for a summary right up front. You simply ignored it. Which is fine, in the sense that you don't have to provide a summary. But by the same token, I too am under no obligations here.
I've asked you several times, on the TPB and now here, to come forward with your interpretation of a view you were actively criticizing (or simply mocking). You've refused every request.
But why? It's especially puzzling given that it's clearly a good policy to preface any criticism of a view with a charitable interpretation of it (that is, if understanding, and not mere intellectual posturing, is your goal). All I can think is that you're perfectly aware that, were you to start, e.g., this discussion by explaining what you take the view to be, you'd find it more difficult to score easy (but hollow) 'victories.'
So please, allow me to lodge the request one more time: Provide a brief exposition, in your own words, of the view as it was presented.
In addition to the general usefulness of such an exposition, I have a further reason for requesting it: If you don't understand the view on the basis of the two posts I wrote, then I simply can't afford to take the time needed to teach you. The posts represent my best efforts as of yet to compress the view and make it as accessible as possible. I realize that my 'best efforts' may have failed. The view is difficult and challenging, even when stripped down to its basics.
The fact is, I think it's quite likely that you don't understand the view. But I'll only know if you explain to me what you think the view is.
The fact is, I think it's quite likely that you don't understand the view. But I'll only know if you explain to me what you think the view is.
Does anyone else know what the view is besides you? And can anyone know what the view is other than your interpretation of the view?
@Pooh Bear
Sure. You can find the posts I'm referring to on Scott Bakker's blog. I'm not sure how to embed links here, so:
http://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2012/03/02/to-know-our-unknowing/
http://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/to-unknow-our-knowing/
The view and my interpretation are, in this case, one and the same: the view just IS my interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Now, we could argue about how best to read Sextus (i.e,. whether my view is right, exegetically), but that would rapidly turn into a horrid mess. I think it's best to stick to the view as I've presented it, since even if it innovates from Sextus's texts, it's still philosophically interesting in its own right.
(And yes, my interpretation of Pyrrhonism is mine: it differs significantly from any other interpretation I've come across in the literature. One of its primary virtues, however, is how it reconciles the insights of so many other views.)
But remember, please, that these post are merely thumbnail sketches of a much more complicated picture.
Also of interest (that is, if you're interested in this stuff!) is another post I made, which abstracts the main epistemological arguments even further:
http://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2012/04/07/the-problem-of-the-infinite-spiral/
@delavagus
It's obvious to everyone that, if Vox were to summarize your view and then shred it, you would attempt to writhe your way out by claiming that your view had been misrepresented. And it's clear that you could have provided a summary with far less effort than you spent making excuses.
I only wish I had the words to properly express how hilarious I find it that the adherents of Know-Nothingness are congratulating themselves for their learned idiocy. For now, this will have to do.
Noah B.! Really?! Why all the hate? You don't know me. Presumably, you know nothing about the interpretation of Pyrrhonism I'm advocating -- and even if you do, it's simply that: an interpretation of some ancient texts. What's there to get so worked up about? Seriously. Chill, dude!
(And please don't pretend you're not worked up. Your language is nothing if not loaded. You talk about Vox 'shredding,' about me 'writhing away,' about how 'hilarious' I am, about my 'learned idiocy.' Pure vitriol, lacking all substance.)
You say, "if Vox were to summarize your view and then shred it, you would attempt to writhe your way out by claiming that your view had been misrepresented."
Apparently it's escaped you that the whole point of asking Vox to summarize my view is to make sure we're on the same page! In other words, the whole point is to first get clear on the view, so that (inter alia) there's no more "writhing room" for me to claim that the view has been misrepresented.
You say: "it's clear that you could have provided a summary with far less effort than you spent making excuses."
Really? Come now, Noah B.! To begin with, I've already given a summary of my view: that summary is contained in the posts themselves, which I link to above. Now, of course I don't expect Vox's summary to be as long as mine, but that's because his would be a compression of my compression of the view.
Moreover, it's simply a fact that texts undergo interpretation by readers. It's also a fact that interpretations of texts vary, i.e., they do not always agree. For this reason, it's extremely valuable to reach mutual understanding on what a text says before arguing over its merits. Only by doing so can we at least hope to avoid speaking past each other. (Which is a good thing, right?)
Finally, if it really is the case that Vox could easily summarize and 'shred' my arguments, why doesn't he do so? (Which is not to say that I think 'shredding' should be the goal here. Rather, to use Vox's own words, I think the goal should be to 'get at the heart of the disagreement.' That is, the goal should be mutual understanding -- which seems to be frowned upon here.)
Why do you have to be so difficult?
I'm not being difficult. I answered your questions in a straightforward and non-evasive manner. Why on Earth do you think it is difficult to have someone ask you questions in return, especially when you have made various claims for which you have offered absolutely no justification?
As you can see, I lodged the request for a summary right up front. You simply ignored it. Which is fine, in the sense that you don't have to provide a summary. But by the same token, I too am under no obligations here. I've asked you several times, on the TPB and now here, to come forward with your interpretation of a view you were actively criticizing (or simply mocking). You've refused every request.
Yes, and I answered the questions in which you were "particularly interested". An invitation to provide a summary is not a question and you are responsible for the expression of your own views, not me. On the other hand, you have not answered my questions. You cannot assume the position of both the participant in and the judge of the discussion, and it is not for you to decide if I have properly understood your arguments or not. If I have not understood them, then you will easily show how my critiques are incorrect or invalid.
You now have a choice. You can either engage in a discussion of equals, in which case I will answer your questions and you will answer mine, or I will simply critique your two posts, thousands of people will read those critiques, and they will be discussed without your participation in the discussion. What is not going to happen is you assuming the posture of the teacher, since you are not my teacher and I am not your student. Rather, you have made certain claims and I have questioned them. I note that by your own words, you are rationally constrained to withdraw those claims if you cannot justify them. So far, you have not even made any attempt to justify them.
If you have a genuinely intellectual bone in your body, you will choose the first option. If you're just another would-be academic who can't bear being questioned the way he questions others - a very common phenomenon - then you will continue to refuse answering my questions.
So, what's it going to be?
Finally, if it really is the case that Vox could easily summarize and 'shred' my arguments, why doesn't he do so?
Because I have no intention of merely shredding the summary. Either we'll have an interesting intellectual discussion and the truth will work itself out through that, or I will shred the entire thing in detail, as is my usual habit. That's one of the things people come here to read, after all.
You don't seem to understand how it works here. I accept challenges from everyone. I don't prequalify them. If someone doesn't understand my views, it's very clear from the questions they ask of me and I show them how and where they've gone awry. And since I don't prequalify anyone or dismiss anyone's right to challenge my claims, I don't accept prequalification from anyone else either. Perhaps you're already too far gone in the academic world to understand that, but if you ever expect anyone to pay attention to you, you'll have to learn that you don't get to choose your critics. And there are few things more valuable to a writer than an intelligent critic offering substantive criticism.
That's how you get better, not by using every excuse possible to avoid having to defend yourself.
By the way, it appears Noah B was entirely correct and you have been using the "requests for summary" tactic as an excuse to avoid having to defend your arguments and justify your claims. Here is your response to pdimov at TPB.
"Given your summaries, I see no reason to respond to you on this topic. Sorry. You’ve clearly made zero effort to understand the position."
Followed by this, after pdimov points out that he both read your posts in their entirety and made an attempt to understand your position.
"Okay, you’re right. There was no cause for me to claim that you made zero effort to understand the view. (Though it does seem that you made zero effort to formulate a charitable interpretation of it!) Even as I recommended that you and Vox read my posts on Pyrrhonism, I knew it was a bad idea, mainly because (believe it or not) I’m actually trying to extricate myself from This Blogging Life."
Now, if you wish to extricate yourself from these discussions of skepticism, then by all means, feel free to run away using whatever excuse best suits you. No one will stop you. But you will have to do so in the knowledge that everyone will see you as an intellectual fraud who won't defend his own arguments. And, let's face it, you know you'll find it hard to be left out of the discussions concerning your two posts. Wouldn't it be preferable to simply engage in a fair and reasonable dialogue of equals?
First of all, I would like to take this opportunity to say "I told you so" ;^)
Next I will enjoy sharing this comments of delavagus' from Wangsty's page
You even went so far as to admit that you don’t consider any of the discussion on this site to constitute ‘debate’! Why? Because we’re all so very far below you, presumably little more than ants.
And I would ask you - how do you expect to have a debate with someone who doesn't even understand (or refuses to acknowledge) that there is a difference between a debate and a discussion. Perhaps a perusal of dictionary should be delavagus' first stop.
"Are you seriously going to assert that there no philosophico-rational thought that is not skepticism?"
I think what is mean is that there is no philosophico-rational thought that is not subject to skepticism.
"The member of the SS-Totenkopfverbände who was morally certain of the rightness of the Final Solution and liquidated the enemies of the National Socialist regime during the day without losing any sleep over it at night is, by Sextus Empiricus's own chosen measure, a more perfect Sceptic than the philosophy student who tosses and turns throughout the night wrestling with the troubling question of his own existence."
Yes, it's more than a little disturbing just how psychologically stable some psychopaths are. That is why they're called psychopaths, but I think it's a mistake to say that the aim of the school defined what the school was about. In relation to Delavagus's posts, mental tranquility was in the domain of common life, something to be achieved after one realized the futility of certainty. (This, according to my non-expert opinion.)
I think what is mean is that there is no philosophico-rational thought that is not subject to skepticism.
That's fine, but in that case, he'll have to concede the point and abandon that defense. Even if all philosophico-rational thought is subject to skepticism, that would not make the self-refuting aspect of skepticism applicable to all philosophico-rational thought. The fact that X is subject to Y does not necessarily give X all the same properties as Y.
Furthermore, even if it were true and X being subject to Y did give X all the same properties as Y, (such as observed property Z), it would be incorrect to say that X and Y having the same properties, including property Z, could somehow prevent Y from possessing property Z. That's just totally illogical, and as I noted, is not a valid defense.
Yes, it's more than a little disturbing just how psychologically stable some psychopaths are. That is why they're called psychopaths, but I think it's a mistake to say that the aim of the school defined what the school was about.
The problmem is that we're not talking about psychopaths here. Most death camp guards were not psychopathic and that fact is directly related to one of the intrinsic problems with the very core of the skeptical philosophy. There are apparently more effective ways of achieving its central aim, one of which may even be rejecting it entirely. But I didn't say that the aim of the school defined what the school is about, (although I think it's wildly incorrect for you to say the end to which all things are done or thought does not define what the school is about), I only pointed out the aim of the school in order to demonstrate the self-refuting aspect of the school's philosophy.
Instead of answering those two questions and justifying his claim, Delavagus made a subsequent, and what very much appears to be an irrelevant, claim about the Agrippan Trilemma. Which I also questioned, and which he also has failed thus far to justify or withdraw.
Do you seriously find his arguments to be in any way convincing right now?
When does skepticism stop? The brain is evaluating data and applying the skepticism filter. The brain has to make a decision to either continue applying the filter, in which case it gets stuck in an infinite loop; or it stops and reaches a conclusion. In either case, a conclusion is reached. In the former it's that an infinite loop is better than terminating the search. So there's certainty in there somewhere.
Do you seriously find his arguments to be in any way convincing right now?
No.
The brain is evaluating data and applying the skepticism filter. The brain has to make a decision to either continue applying the filter, in which case it gets stuck in an infinite loop; or it stops and reaches a conclusion.
Hmmm, that's a much more succinct way of putting something that I'd been contemplating myself. It's also a neat way of confronting the infinite regress argument.
VD April 25, 2012 8:13 AM - Do you seriously find his arguments to be in any way convincing right now?
I'm convinced he's a snake, like the rest of them. Bakker has made several appeals and attempts to shame you into changing your mind about your views. This dude thinks you're difficult. Instead of getting to facts, logic, reasoning - they whine about you being you.
Their fear of those not of their ideology is projection. One can easily imagine that those of this mentality would use much more than verbal admonishments to change you if they had the power to do so. Like all godless leftists, thinking they know better than everyone, they unceasingly endeavor to make the world the utopia only they can achieve - except for people like Vox who are making it so difficult.
wrf3
In the former it's that an infinite loop is better than terminating the search.
Therein lies the "tranquility."
By accepting the illusion of progressive, working-toward-a-target thought, the skeptic finds the bliss of deciding to be indecisive for as long as the process can endure. It is theoretically self-soothing - like an anxious person who rocks back and forth to calm themselves down.
It works better in theory than in practice, where the result is either a nervous state of indecision, or an arbitrary sleight of hand to suspend skepticism without acknowledging it.
Daniel: Therein lies the "tranquility."
Why is one illusion more "tranquil" than the other? Mentally revving the brain with it in idle, versus turning the engine off and sitting under the lotus tree contemplating nothing? Even that decision means that skepticism was turned off and certainty was reached.
I find delavagus's repeated requests for a summary interesting, given that he is unwilling or unable to provide such a summary himself. It appears to me that he is, of all people, in the best position to summarize his views in less space than that taken up by the posts themselves. And if that's not, in his opinion, possible, why does he expect us to be able to?
But maybe I'm just being too literal in my interpretation of "summary"?
I find delavagus's repeated requests for a summary interesting, given that he is unwilling or unable to provide such a summary himself.
The combination of his response to you with his refusal to justify his own claims strongly suggests that he's using those requests as an excuse to avoid having his arguments critiqued. It's a variant of a tactic popular among academics; of course, they usually demand academic credentials instead of a summary. The purpose is to give themselves an out from a debate they want to avoid.
wrf
Why is one illusion more "tranquil" than the other? Mentally revving the brain with it in idle, versus turning the engine off and sitting under the lotus tree contemplating nothing? Even that decision means that skepticism was turned off and certainty was reached.
Well, the loop-illusion tranquilty provides a trance-like state so that one does not have to (in fact, is not capable of) providing the "skeptical of skepticsm" shut-down conclusion. The shut-down conclusion holds no loop-illusion trance, and its arbitrariness invites skepticism ("Why did I stop here? Shouldn't I be more skeptical of this definition?") which starts the cycle again. But, you are correct, there really is no difference: both ends can mimic tranquility.
Though both have their versions of "tranquility," but I was speaking more of the trance-effect of pretending to have never decided.
But I put "tranquility" in quotes because it is actually a cheap substitute for tranquility of thought. Sort of like how an addict thinks that meth keeps him "alert" even as he is completely unaware that his clothes have fallen off his emaciated body.
But that sort of tranquility comes to each skeptic as his pleasures dictate, I suppose. Which is why you have the decisive skeptic and the indecisive one, both drawing their conclusions without logical basis.
Which is, as has been mentioned before, why the Stoics do it better by a country mile.
"This creates two problems. It should be readily apparent that we can observe here that the Sceptic is claiming knowledge of things that, by virtue of his own philosophical system, he cannot possibly know. If he cannot know that the soul exists, he cannot reasonably aim for its tranquility. If he cannot know what tranquility is, he cannot aim for helping his soul reach that state. If he has no quantifiable metric for the things that life imposes, he cannot know what is excess, what is insufficient, and still less what is that desired moderation."
This might double as a defense of divine revelation through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; how can the "sceptic" *know* anything with the degree of certainty necessary to function practically in life, without access to some form of knowledge that transcends doubt and scepticism? What source of knowledge has that kind of authority?
I don't understand your attitude, Vox. I asked you to summarize the view then explain why it's wrong (assuming, correctly, that you'd think it was wrong). I then specified, under the heading 'why it's wrong,' a couple specific questions I have. I find it interesting that you fixed upon the specific questions, since the reason I asked them is because I knew you already had strong views regarding the supposed incoherence of skepticism. All you've done here, as far as I can see, is reaffirm your preexisting views, without taking the substance of my posts into consideration at all.
At any rate, my primary interest here is to know what you think you're critiquing. This, you may recall, has been my interest since you first showed up on the recent TPB threads, namely, to figure out just what you think these views are that you find so horrendously stupid. But you've yet to offer a single account, as far as I can see. From the start, I've smelled a rat -- a fact about which I've been perfectly clear! Your continued refusal to meet me halfway by first explaining what you take the view to be has just made the stink of intellectual dishonesty worse.
Asking you to summarize the view you're rejecting is hardly the outrageous request you make it out to be. Whenever I lead a discussion on a text, I first make my students write individual summaries. We then start the discussion by comparing summaries and deciding on a single, unified one -- deciding, in other words, on what it is we're going to talk about. It's extremely effective.
As far as I can see, the only reason you've given for not summarizing the view is: "I don't want to! I shouldn't have to! You can't ask me to do that!"
But come on, Vox! If you understand the view, you should be able to summarize it easily enough. And if you can't easily summarize it, then it would seem you don't understand the view.
And if you don't understand the view, then I would indeed (at least initially) have to be the 'teacher' in this scenario, and you would have to be the 'student' (I can guess how well THAT would go!). Contrary to what you said above, this does not entail that we would not discuss as 'equals' in any important sense. But even so, I doubt very much that you would allow yourself to be 'taught' anything by me -- hence my reluctance to get into this with you.
The fact is, I know more about ancient skepticism than you do. It's my specialty. Moreover, what we're talking about is MY OWN VIEW of Pyrrhonism. Obviously I know more about it than you do. So what I'm interested in gauging, before we potentially begin discussing the matter, is how well you've understood what I was trying to say.
I don't see why you're so resistant, unless (as I said earlier) you know that summarizing the view would make it more difficult to straw-man it.
As for your specific questions -- all I can do is shake my head, since they're both answered in the posts themselves. As far as I can see, you don't actually address the arguments I make. If I'm wrong, you haven't shown that I'm wrong -- for the simple reason that you've ignored my arguments almost completely, simply rehashing the very anti-skeptical arguments that I discuss (and defend Pyrrhonism against) in the posts themselves.
So, unless you deign to use your Super Intelligence to carry out the simple exegetical task I've requested, a task that would demonstrate a willingness on your part to deal fairly and honestly with me, then I'm not going to bother with you. You and your Voxyites can draw whatever damning conclusions you want from this -- I'm afraid of your superior intellect, I'm incapable of defending the view because I'm simply 'regurgitating' things I've been taught, whatever -- but I couldn't care less.
pdimov: "I find delavagus's repeated requests for a summary interesting, given that he is unwilling or unable to provide such a summary himself. It appears to me that he is, of all people, in the best position to summarize his views in less space than that taken up by the posts themselves. And if that's not, in his opinion, possible, why does he expect us to be able to?"
I can see what you're saying. There does seem to be an inconsistency here. On the one hand, I said (not here, but on the TPB) that my two posts on Pyrrhonism represent my best efforts so far to condense the view into a generally accessible form. On the other hand, I ask Vox to summarize the view. But if I think that the view can't be further compressed, then what exactly do I expect Vox to do?
But the inconsistency is only apparent. My posts are as compressed as I've been able to make the view STARTING FROM SCRATCH, that is, addressing an audience with no prior knowledge of ancient skepticism. But a summary of the view as presented would not be under that constraint. Vox can assume that I'm familiar with the view. He can dispense with the details. He doesn't have to PRESENT the view; he merely has to SUMMARIZE it. (The apparent inconsistency, then, arises because I may have characterized the posts themselves as 'summaries' of a larger view -- but really they're thumbnail presentations of a larger view.)
Let me say, yet again, that having someone summarize a text is the single most effective and efficient way to gauge the degree to or ways in which their understanding of it and yours converge or diverge. Just as importantly, taking the time to put a view into your own words can help illuminate the view in your own mind.
Am I wrong?
So while I absolutely agree with you, pdimov, that I'm in the best position to summarize the view, my doing so would not serve the purpose that would be served by VOX summarizing the view for himself. It would literally defeat the purpose.
If Vox would like, I'd be happy to offer my own summary after he's presented his. But what I've wanted from him *from the start* of this whole thing was a characterization, in his own words, of the views he so loudly rejects. I'm being perfectly honest when I say that I actually think he's incapable of doing it without exposing himself as simply a bad, tendentious, uncharitable reader.
And if I'm right and he IS a bad, tendentious, uncharitable reader -- which, from what I've seen so far, seems to be the case -- then I'm not foolish enough to think he would be any better, less tendentious, or more charitable in discussion with me.
And life's too short.
I don't see why you're so resistant, unless (as I said earlier) you know that summarizing the view would make it more difficult to straw-man it.
Then, as numerous people have pointed out, including me, you're not very intelligent. As will be subsequently demonstrated.
As for your specific questions -- all I can do is shake my head, since they're both answered in the posts themselves. As far as I can see, you don't actually address the arguments I make. If I'm wrong, you haven't shown that I'm wrong -- for the simple reason that you've ignored my arguments almost completely, simply rehashing the very anti-skeptical arguments that I discuss (and defend Pyrrhonism against) in the posts themselves.
No, they're not. I haven't simply rehashed the anti-skeptical arguments at all, I have instead pointed out you did not successfully defend Pyrrhonism against them. You are clearly in over your head here, little college boy. As will be subsequently demonstrated.
So, unless you deign to use your Super Intelligence to carry out the simple exegetical task I've requested, a task that would demonstrate a willingness on your part to deal fairly and honestly with me, then I'm not going to bother with you.
Which is, of course, the excuse everyone knew you were attempting to manufacture. And do remember that you've declared you're not going to bother with me, as you will not be permitted to post comments on the posts that address your arguments. Now run along, little sceptic.
You're just proving my point, Vox. Your interpretation even of *my posts here* is deeply tendentious and uncharitable.
But anyway. I had a little spare time this morning and have come up with a response to your post. Here it is. (I've had to split it into multiple comments, since it exceeded the word-count limit.)
Question 1: What do you think the incoherence of Pyrrhonism consists in?
Your response: "I think the incoherence consists of the inherent contradiction between its arguments and its aims." You then invoke Sextus's discussion of ataraxia as the telos of Pyrrhonism.
You claim that this passage creates two problems: (1) "the Sceptic is claiming knowledge of things that, by virtue of his own philosophical system, he cannot possibly know." You say: "Pyrrhonian scepticism is incoherent as both a philosophy and as a way of life because it is little more than a philosophically offensive weapon that can be trained just as effectively on its own stated purposes as on anything else."
(2) Pyrrhonism "can be shown to empirically fail as well," since (a) doxastic certainty is in fact what leads to ataraxia, (b) philosophy students, on the contrary, 'toss and turn' on account of their philosophical uncertainty, and (c) the people on the TPB are clearly not in a state of atarxia.
Question 2: In what way does Sextus's argument against peritrope fail?
They fail, you claim, on three counts: (1) Sextus conflates Pyrrhonism with philosophy as such; (2) even if Pyrrhonism succeeds in undermining all philosophico-rational thought, then it follows that it also undermines itself, since it too is a philosophy; (3) his arguments undermine themselves (really, there's no new content in the third point: it simply reiterates the substance of (2)).
Notice, now, that I've helpfully begun with a summary of your position. If I've misrepresnted you, you can let me know.
Now, my response to you, Vox, is to point out that the content of my posts is nowhere to be found in anything you say here.
(Continued...)
[POST 2]
First of all, let me say that I failed to make this plain from the start, but I should have: what I'm asking you to do is address the view *as presented*, not to address any old interpretation of Pyrrhonism. There is vast debate and disagreement about how best to intrepret Pyrrhonism, debates we cannot possibly hope to adjudicate here. Best to stick with my view as presented, since even if it is not the best interpretation of Pyrrhonism, it is still philosophically interesting in its own right -- and is, at any rate, certainly a kind of skepticism.
Now, your appeal to ataraxia goes beyond the scope of my view as presented, since I make no mention of it in my presentation. (This is the most important sense in which my thumbnail presentation is incomplete qua intepretation of Pyrrhonism.)
Even so, your claim -- namely, that a Pyrrhonian has no right to "Claim knowledge of things that, by virtue of his own philosohical system, he cannot possibly know" -- is, on my account, patently false. Moreover, it's simply bad philosophy and bad exegesis, for the following reasons (here, I'll draw on elements of Pyrrhonism that are not present in my posts, though I'll do so as little as possible):
(1) It's bad exegesis because Pyrrhonians' utterances are, Sextus tells us over and over again, simply reports of their phantasia -- appearances, which are not to be understood in the narrow way as indicating sense-perception only; rather, 'appearances' must be understood in a rich, phenomenological way, as 'how the world shows up' for the Pyrrhonian. Not only do tables and chair 'appear' thus-and-so, but also arguments can 'appear' good or bad, actions can 'appear' warranted or unwarranted, etc. In talking about the telos of Pyrrhonism, the Pyrrhonian is talking about how things appear *to him*, not how things really are. Thus, it is not the case that the Pyrrhonian is *claiming knowledge* (in the strong sense of 'justified true belief') of "things... he cannot possibly know." Rather, he is simply stating how things appear to him to be (cf., Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.15). Sextus devotes Chapters 18-28 of Book 1 of the Outlines to explaining how the Pyrrhonian's utterances are to be taken: namely, as appearance-statements (broadly construed), not as statements about how-things-necessarily-are.
[POST 3]
(2) It's also bad exegesis because, as is clear to anyone with a background in ancient philosophy, Sextus, in discussing the telos of skepticism, is simply borrowing the definition of the dogmatists. As he does in so much of the Outlines, Sextus is here speaking to dogmatists using concepts and views they themselves endorse. He's saying: "This is what you call a telos. Without holding opinions on the subject [adoxastos] -- that is, without claiming that this is how-things-necessarily-are -- we say that the telos (which is, again, your own concept) of Pyrrhonism is tranquility."
(3) Also, it's terribly unfortunate to render 'ataraxia' as 'tranquility of the soul.' There's a sense in which that's all right, but the problem is that it's very likely to mislead modern -- especially Christian -- readers into thinking that what Sextus means by 'soul' is similar to what they understand by 'soul.' It is not.
(4) Finally, it's bad philosophy because Sextus, contra the words you put into his mouth, does NOT claim knowledge of anything in the passage you cite. The only way to get this conclusion is to assume that any assertion is automatically a knowledge-claim. But this is clearly false. Some commentators, for instance, read Sextus's texts as drenched in irony.
(5) Finally, it's a bad interpretation of my account since, as I argue in my second post, Pyrrhonism ought to be seen as a kind of proto-contextualism, according to which the Pyrrhonian WILL after all make 'knowledge-claims' but only in an 'everyday' way, not in a 'philosophical' way.
[POST 4]
Now, let's consider this claim of yours: You say, "Pyrrhonian scepticism is incoherent as both a philosophy and as a way of life because it is little more than a philosophically offensive weapon that can be trained just as effectively on its own stated purposes as on anything else."
But notice that, in my second post, I clearly state that Sextus recognizes -- indeed, embraces -- this feature of Pyrrhonism. You do make some effort to engage with the points I make in this part of my post when you turn to explaining why you think Sextus's arguments against the success of peritrope arguments vis-a-vis skepticism fail, so let's turn to what you say there, then come back to your claims about how Pyrrhonism can be shown 'empirically' to fail as a way of life.
First, you say that Sextus "erroneously conflates the subset (his particular philosophy) with the set (all philosophico-rational thought); because there is philosophico-rational thought that is not Pyrrhonian scepticism, all refutation of the latter cannot automatically be taken as any refutation of the former."
This fails to address the arguments that lead up to following conclusion, which appears in my second post: "Thus, the self-refutatory character of skepticism demonstrates the self-refutatory character of all philosophizing done under the aegis of the rational commitments that give rise to the skeptical conclusion." Pyrrhonism is a metaphilosophy, not a philosophy: it is philosophizing about philosophy itself, about rational thought as such. On my view, it contains no first-order philosophical claims whatsoever. In other words, it is NOT a member of the 'set' 'Philosophies'; it is a critique of the set-as-such.
The problem of the criterion and the challenge of the Agrippan trilemma are not inventions of the Pyrrhonian: they are codifications of standing epistemological dilemmas (the problem of the criterion goes back at least to Plato). Anyone who wants to claim that they possess a justification has two choices: either they find a way to solve the problem of the criterion (i.e., find a way to escape the Agrippan trilemma), or else they demonstrate why the problem of the criterion is only a psuedo-problem.
[POST 5]
You then say: "even if Sextus were correct and charging the skeptic with self-refutation did amount to charging philosophico-rational thought as such with self-refutation, that doesn't change the fact that since Pyrrhonian scepticism is a subset of philosophico-rational thought, if the charge is substantiated and all philosophico-rational thought is, in fact, self-refuting, then the charge of peritrope against Scepticism must also be correct!"
In response to this, I would direct you once again to my posts. I clearly state that the Pyrrhonian DOES consider his argument to be self-refuting: "He likens them to purgative drugs, which drain themselves away along with the humors they were administered to treat, or to a ladder one kicks away after having climbed up over it." But that's not the end of the story. "But Pyrrhonism doesn’t stop there, for the conclusion that philosophico-rational thought is rationally ungrounded is itself rationally ungrounded. In other words, for Pyrrhonians, the skeptical conclusion is just one more thing to be skeptical about... Pyrrhonians are willing to accept that philosophico-rational thought may not in fact be rationally ungrounded; they claim merely that, given these apparently unavoidable rational commitments—commitments without which it seems impossible that there could be any such thing as a search for truth—it seems that our justifications fail, that our thinking turns back on itself, like a mother consuming her offspring, that our knowing drops out of the picture."
These comments intoduce the important idea of the Pyrrhonian's "return to common life": "To Pyrrhonians, common life (that is, the appearances) is a sort of pragmatic-transcendental framework, an immanent, ground-level framework that comes into view only upon the collapse of the illusory philosophico-rational framework built atop it." I go on to argue that Pyrrhonism is best understood as a kind of proto-contextualism.
It appears that you either don't understand the force of these arguments or simply ignored them in order to set up a straw-man.
[POST 6]
Now, let's return to your claim that Pyrrhonism can be 'empirically' proven false.
You make three claims in this connection: (a) doxastic certainty is in fact what leads to ataraxia, (b) 'uncertain' philosophy students 'toss and turn' on account of philosophical uncertainty, (c) the people on the TPB are clearly not in a state of atarxia.
I would remind you again that the notion of atraxia -- how best to understand it, how it fits into my view -- is NOT present in my posts AT ALL. So I'd rather put it to one side, since my views on the subject are not on the table. But I will say this: regarding (a), you need to have in view a exegetically plausible interpretation of what Sextus means by 'ataraxia,' not to mention 'life adoxastos,' before you can claim that Sextus's life adoxastos is not conducive to ataraxia or that an ultra-dogmatic SS officer can be said to enjoy the *sort* of ataraxia he's talking about. Since you haven't done any of this leg-work, there's no way to evaluate your claim in light of Pyrrhonism.
That said, I agree that your argument is intuitive. Exactly this question has been raised vis-a-vis Pyrrhonian ataraxia numerous times in the literature. But it is in fact an *open question*, whereas you seem to consider the matter closed -- even though, again, you haven't even provided an account of ataraxia or the life adoxastos!
Regarding (b) and (c), I've never claimed that philosophy students or the folks on the TPB were Pyrrhonians, nor even that they have the goal of becoming Pyrrhonians, let alone that they have achieved ataraxia. As for (b), Sextus is clear that part of the Pyrrhonian therapy is precisely to get us to stop being worried about philosophical problems. The proto-Pyrrhonian *starts out* "troubled by the anomaly in things and puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to" (Outlines 1.12); part of what the Pyrrhonian therapy does is *cure* the proto-Pyrrhonian of this sort of 'troubledness' and 'puzzlement'
Much the same goes for (c): no doubt the folks on the TPB, like most folks, could do with a bit more ataraxia. I know I struggle with it. But as Brian Ribeiro has argued (quite convincingly, I think), the skeptical 'telos' of ataraxia, and the life adoxastos that is said to underpin it, can be seen as ethical ideals, as objects of aspiration that, even if they can never be fully achieved, can serve to orient us. In this way, he compares the ethical ideal of Pyrrhonism with the (similarly unachievable) ethical ideals of Stoicism and (certain branches of) Christianity.
[Oops. That last post, POST 7, was the final one.]
Notice, now, that I've helpfully begun with a summary of your position. If I've misrepresnted you, you can let me know. Now, my response to you, Vox, is to point out that the content of my posts is nowhere to be found in anything you say here.
No, I don't think you've misrepresented anything here. And I concur, the content of your posts had nothing to do with the questions you asked. I note you even pointed out that your posts should not be confused with Pyrrhonism proper, but that you had some interesting ideas that were worth considering anyhow. Which is fine, but you asked about "the incoherence of Pyrrhonism", not "the incoherence of my two-post defense of ancient skepticism".
You say I'm not charitable. That's fair enough, (although you'll note that I have merely been responding in the same manner I've been addressed at TPB), but in response, I can only say that you would appear to be more than a little careless with your words.
Anyhow, I appreciate your response to my answers to your questions, and you have provided answers to my two questions, so feel free to comment on the Dissecting the Skeptics posts. No doubt your comments here will prove useful in going through your two posts.
If we're going to get picky about words, then I would point out that I did NOT in fact ask about "the incoherence of Pyrrhonism," but rather the "incoherence of skepticism." Admittedly, this is ambiguous between various kinds of skepticism. But I'd think it should be clear, however, that I was referring to the 'skepticism' that is adumbrated in the posts I was asking about!
(Yes, I refer to "Sextus’s argument against peritrope," but in my posts, I put words into Sextus's mouth. Again, I'd think it should be clear that I was referring to the 'arguments against peritrope' that I discussed in the posts.)
Oh, and where might I find these 'Dissecting the Skeptics' posts?
If we're going to get picky about words, then I would point out that I did NOT in fact ask about "the incoherence of Pyrrhonism," but rather the "incoherence of skepticism."
That's true... but keep in mind that you were asking why I think skepticism is incoherent. Sextus is the only skeptic I have read, so Pyrrhonism is my frame of reference for philosophical skepticism.
Oh, and where might I find these 'Dissecting the Skeptics' posts?
On the front page. I'm going through your two posts one chunk at a time. Feel free to jump in; no doubt you'll have plenty of objections....
Let me knock 3) off straight away: no one misunderstands what the concept of "tranquility" or "tranquility of the soul" mean.
It's not an unfortunate use. It is not a bad translation. It is a perfectly fine English expression of the concept. The fact that you get hung up on the phantom misunderstanding is a bad distraction.
delavagus,
Just a quick note about the charitable summary business.
I have, in fact, provided a summary of the portion of your views which I challenge. It is this sentence:
Adopting Pyrrhonian skepticism makes us better.
My challenge to you has been that you've provided no evidence for this claim.
The reason I can get away with picking this particular claim, without engaging you on Pyrrhonism per se, is that the claim stands on its own. It does not depend in any way on whether Pyrrhonism is right, wrong, or not even wrong. Adopting a wrong or incoherent belief system can still make someone a better person.
@Daniel
Okay. But do you understand what 'ataraxia' means? Do you know what Sextus meant by it? Given that these questions are matters of longstanding debate, it's great to hear that it's all merely a "phantom misunderstanding"! Good thing you're here to settle this for the philosophical community once and for all. Enlighten me, please!
@pdimov
As far as I can see, I've only once used something like the phrase you're challenging -- and that was in a comment, not in the posts themselves. Here's my comment in full:
"The goal of Pyrrhonism as I understand it is to demonstrate our apparent ignorance of even the most seemingly obvious things — our inability to (fully) justify anything — in order to transform our second-order doxastic attitude, that is, our attitude toward our beliefs.
"Pyrrhonism has a therapeutic intent, in other words. The thought is that being forced to reach the 'honest' conclusion that 'one doesn’t know' can have a transformative effect on us, one that — by the skeptic's lights — makes us better people.
"My favorite, melodramatic example is this: a Pyrrhonian might very well believe in God (Montaigne was a Pyrrhonian and a Catholic), but he’s unlikely to burn another person at the stake for failing to share his belief. (There’s much more to be said about this, of course, but I hope you can see where I’m coming from — and where I’m going — with this.)"
Now, it seems to me that this question does NOT 'stand on its own.' Rather, it depends on first getting clear on (a) what 'Pyrrhonian skepticism' is, (b) what 'adopting it' amounts to, and (c) what 'better' means in this context.
As for 'evidence,' I would say: Montaigne's Essais. The Essais are the man, and the man is the Essais: he is the matter of his book, and it stands as a testament to the spiritual/psychological benefits of the skeptical way of life. If you find nothing to admire in Montaigne, then we'll just have to disagree about what does and does not 'make us better.'
@Vox
Hold on. I gotta call bullshit here.
You wrote: "the content of your posts had nothing to do with the questions you asked."
That's clearly false. It's false in the obvious sense that the questions are about Pyrrhonism and my posts are about Pyrrhonism. But more importantly, it's false because of the context in which the questions themselves were posed. Allow me to remind you once again:
"... in the interests of 'getting at the heart of the disagreement,' I invite you (a) to explain what the view is, and then (b) to explain why it’s wrong. I’m particularly interested if, after reading, you still want to charge skepticism with incoherence. If so, (a) what do you think the incoherence consists in? and (b) in what way does Sextus’s argument against peritrope fail?"
Clearly, I'm asking the questions with reference to "the view" -- I specifically ask what you think AFTER READING the two posts I linked to. As a super intelligence, you could not possibly miss something so obvious!
Moreover, you clearly did NOT miss it. It's clear from earlier things you said in this thread that you did NOT see yourself as responding only to general questions about Pyrrhonism, without reference to my posts.
For instance, you wrote: "it is not for you to decide if I have properly understood your arguments or not. If I have not understood them, then you will easily show how my critiques are incorrect or invalid."
This clearly implies that you viewed this post as a "critique" of "[my] arguments."
And you wrote: "Rather, you have made certain claims and I have questioned them... So far, you have not even made any attempt to justify them."
This says straight out (a) you that were responding to MY claims, and (b) that I haven't made any attempt to justify those claims... despite the fact that I wrote two blog entries on the subject in which I do just that!
Finally you wrote just now: "I note you even pointed out that your posts should not be confused with Pyrrhonism proper, but that you had some interesting ideas that were worth considering anyhow. Which is fine, but you asked about 'the incoherence of Pyrrhonism', not 'the incoherence of my two-post defense of ancient skepticism'."
But this isn't quite right either. I never said that my view should not be "confused with Pyrrhonism proper," since I think it IS Pyrrhonism. All I said is that there is a difference between questioning the view qua exegesis and questioning it qua philosophy. I've stated my conviction that getting into a debate over the proper interpretation of Pyrrhonism is pointless here. I stand by that. But that does not mean I can't speak of 'Pyrrhonism' in connection with my view -- since, again, the view just IS (elements of) my interpretation of Pyrrhonism.
As far as I can see, I've only once used something like the phrase you're challenging -- and that was in a comment, not in the posts themselves.
It's a summary, not a quote.
Now, it seems to me that this question does NOT 'stand on its own.' Rather, it depends on first getting clear on (a) what 'Pyrrhonian skepticism' is, (b) what 'adopting it' amounts to, and (c) what 'better' means in this context.
Fully agreed on (c). I was unable to determine what you mean by better. You state that
We’re all idiots. The more we accept this—the more we become good at not knowing—the more learned we will be.
so perhaps better means "more learned". You also state:
Pyrrhonians, in other words, will live adoxastōs—free of the second-order belief that their first-order beliefs are (ultimately) justified.
This might sound like a trivial accomplishment, but I don’t think it is. The desire—the felt need—for objective justification is what leads people to claim to possess it (or at least to act as though they possess it), and I would argue that it is this myopic privileging of one’s own prejudices—the baseless elevation of the parochial to the universal—that has underwritten history’s greatest atrocities and that continually threatens to give rise to any number of fresh horrors.
which would imply that you believe that a society of Pyrrhonians would not commit those atrocities.
My favorite, melodramatic example is this: a Pyrrhonian might very well believe in God (Montaigne was a Pyrrhonian and a Catholic), but he’s unlikely to burn another person at the stake for failing to share his belief.
It might well be that the person who is already unlikely to burn another at the stake would find Pyrrhonism to his taste.
As for 'evidence,' I would say: Montaigne's Essais.
Montaigne may be an exception. It is possible that Pyrrhonism only works for one person in a million. A society of Pyrrhonians may still be worse than a society of non-Pyrrhonians; not everyone can be a Montaigne.
Stated differently, the fact that better people tend to be Pyrrhonians (if true) doesn't mean that Pyrrhonism makes people better.
Hold on. I gotta call bullshit here. You wrote: "the content of your posts had nothing to do with the questions you asked." That's clearly false.
Oh, Sweet Sextus, but you are all over the place. Look, I was merely attempting to agree with you when you wrote: Now, my response to you, Vox, is to point out that the content of my posts is nowhere to be found in anything you say here. That was the full extent of my intention, not to claim there was no connection to your two posts at all, which as you say, is clearly false. I obviously didn't phrase that precisely enough.
However, I think we need to stop trying to have what is now three simultaneous discussions about the different aspects of the same thing at the same time. I answered your questions. Now you have answered mine. That's great. I'm now in the process of critiquing your two posts and will be doing so over the next two weeks. I think we will cover the points you've raised here in response to my answers in that process, if not, feel free to raise them afterward.
I would suggest, however, that if you do get involved in discussing your posts, you try to resist the temptation to jump ahead and instead focus on the section being addressed.
Vox: "Look, I was merely attempting to agree with you when you wrote: Now, my response to you, Vox, is to point out that the content of my posts is nowhere to be found in anything you say here. That was the full extent of my intention..."
Fair enough. But as I said, it also seemed to me that you were contradicting yourself: that you claimed at first to be critiquing my views, but that you then retreated to the safer position of merely having 'answered the questions.' I find this kind of slipperiness suspicious, thus worthy of being pointed out.
@pdimov
You're right. I make a number of vague remarks to the effect that Pyrrhonism is in some sense 'a good thing.' And you're right that these views are not defended; they're mostly just some rhetorical filigree used to round-out the posts (which isn't necessarily a bad thing: I was doing my best to make a boring subject interesting to read).
So basically I think we're on the same page. Unfortunately, these issues are not something I'm prepared to get into just now. I will point out, though, that I'm not convinced by your simple reversal of the causal story. You made a similar move on the TPB, if I recall. You MIGHT be right, e.g., that 'dehumanizing the enemy' is caused by war, rather than war being underwritten by a dehumanized view of the enemy. At this point, though, all we have to go on are our intuitions. Neither of us have put forward any supporting evidence. My intuition apparently differs from yours on this and similar matters.
Things are clearer in the case of religious conflict, I think, since the religious views obviously predate the killing.
Your claim here -- "it might well be that the person who is already unlikely to burn another at the stake would find Pyrrhonism to his taste" -- actually reminds me of Brian Leiter's 'doctrine of types' interpretation of Nietzsche: what sort of philosophical (esp. ethical) view you hold will be a function of your 'type' (i.e., 'slave' type, 'master' type, etc.).
I think there's definitely SOMETHING to this, but I doubt it's the whole story, either in fact or in Nietzsche.
So many fascinating issues here, so little time...
Switching to another fascinating angle, do you think that the first-order beliefs of a Pyrrhonian are more likely to be true than the first-order beliefs of a non-Pyrrhonian?
@pdimov
Huh. Interesting question. Well -- I'm sure you're sick of this sort of response, but... -- I think it depends on what we mean by 'likely to be true.'
From a philosophical perspective, I think the answer is no: epistemically, all first-order beliefs are, from a philosophical perspective, equal. From an everyday perspective, I suspect the question is ill-formed, i.e., simply doesn't apply. Everyday epistemic practices, on my view, have their associated everyday 'brute assumptions' that give (local) epistemic authority to one's claims. I'm not sure that one's second-order attitude toward his local epistemic practice will have any necessary impact on his effectiveness in making use of those practices.
That said, I'm inclined -- unsurprisingly, perhaps -- to think that, ceteris paribus, the Pyrrhonian might have an edge, since (ex hypothesi) he has a clearer view of the 'terrain of the everyday,' that is, he sees the everyday epistemic practices for what they are.
There might even be some evidence to support this, if we can trust the famous stories about the virtuosic debating abilities of some of the most famous ancient Academic skeptics.
It would be interesting to pursue this...
Gawd, you keep sucking me in! I have actual WORK to do!
But as I said, it also seemed to me that you were contradicting yourself: that you claimed at first to be critiquing my views, but that you then retreated to the safer position of merely having 'answered the questions.' I find this kind of slipperiness suspicious, thus worthy of being pointed out.
Absolutely. To be clear, "critiquing your views" was meant to refer to my planned critique of your two posts. Answering the questions was just answering the three questions I answered. I obviously did not maintain the distinction well, the fault is mine.
That said, I'm inclined -- unsurprisingly, perhaps -- to think that, ceteris paribus, the Pyrrhonian might have an edge...
Yep. Let's assume that for the sake of argument. The Pyrrhonian's first-order beliefs are more likely to be true. It makes sense, then, that all his beliefs are more likely to be true, and that he doesn't have the second-order beliefs that others have simply because these second-order beliefs are likely to be false.
In other words - here comes the reversal - the lack of second-order beliefs that you admire is merely an effect of his general superiority in formulating true beliefs, not its cause.
Gawd, you keep sucking me in! I have actual WORK to do!
Heh.
You might want to also look into Bayesianism, and Eliezer Yudkowski's writings. For a Bayesian, talking about certainty and uncertainty as binary states makes no sense; there are continuous degrees of uncertainty. Claims have a Bayesian probability between 0 and 1, even though they don't necessarily have an ordinary, frequentist, probability; they are either true or false.
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